
















































































































































































































































































































                                                 
1  The  term  “charro”  refers  to  officials  of  state‐linked,  corrupt, undemocratic  unions. While 






































































































































































































































Wage	 	 Average	Contractual	Wage	in	Branches	under	Federal	Jurisdiction	 Average	Wages	in	Manufacturing	Industry	
		 		 		 		 		
1980	 	 100.00	 	 100.00 100.00	
1985	 	 68.13	 	 78.39 96.56	
1990	 	 49.30	 	 63.63 78.39	
1991	 	 46.53	 	 64.32 83.04	
1992	 	 41.85	 	 62.37 90.13	
1993	 	 42.10	 	 62.35 85.14	
1994	 	 41.66	 	 61.37 88.64	
1995	 	 35.11	 	 51.05 77.26	
1996	 	 36.05	 	 45.97 69.92	
1997	 	 31.80	 	 45.54 69.46	
1998	 	 34.56	 	 46.24 71.47	
1999	 	 31.32	 	 46.20 72.49	
2000	 	 31.51	 	 47.43 76.81	
2001	 	 32.03	 	 48.65 81.88	
2002	 	 32.06	 	 49.01 83.41	
2003	 	 32.14	 	 49.10 84.51	
2004	 	 31.44	 	 48.84 84.70	
2005	 	 31.79	 	 49.02 84.06	
2006	 	 31.52	 	 49.25 84.73	
2007	 	 31.41	 	 49.43 85.33	
2008	 	 30.23	 	 49.04 86.43	
2009	 	 30.53	 	 48.62 86.27	
2010	 	 30.32	 	 46.83 79.50	
Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2010.	
	
We	can	get	a	better	handle	on	the	significance	of	this	fall	of	the	
share	of	wages	in	the	GDP	of	Mexico	if	we	put	it	in	comparative	context	in	
terms	of	the	cost	of	living	and	real	purchasing	power	parities	in	the	
economies	of	various	countries.	The	relative	level	of	wages	in	Mexico	has	
been	steadily	declining	in	the	last	quarter	century.	The	report	by	the	Union	
Banks	of	Switzerland,	Price	and	Earnings	around	the	Globe	(Union	Banks	of	
Switzerland	2009,	9)	shows	that	wages	in	Mexico	City	are	among	the	
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lowest	of	the	60	most	important	cities	in	the	world.	In	2009,	average	wages	
in	Mexico	City	were	fifteen	times	lower	than	the	New	York	City,	eleven	
times	lower	than	those	of	Chicago,	eight	times	less	than	those	of	Montreal,	
four	times	less	than	Seoul,	three	times	less	than	Sao	Paulo	and	two	times	
less	than	those	of	Santiago	de	Chile.	This	report	shows	that	the	view	that	
the	People's	Republic	of	China	has	lower	wages	than	Mexico	is	false.	The	
salaries	of	Shanghai	or	Beijing	were	more	than	double	that	of	Mexico	City	
in	2009.	
This	situation	has	deteriorated	further	in	recent	decades.	It	was	not	
just	a	result	of	the	economic	disasters	of	the	eighties.	Since	1994,	the	
relative	situation	of	wages	in	Mexico	has	deteriorated,	even	in	the	period	of	
alleged	fiscal	responsibility	and	equilibrium.	In	1994,	according	to	the	
same	report,	Price	and	Earnings	around	the	Globe,	Mexican	wages	were	
much	closer	to	the	main	cities	of	the	world.	Wages	in	New	York	and	
Chicago	were	just	five	times	higher	than	Mexico	City;	those	of	Montreal	
were	slightly	more	than	four	times	that	of	Mexico	City.	In	almost	all	cases	
the	distance	was	half	of	what	it	is	now.	Wages	in	Seoul	were	only	two	times	
higher	than	Mexico	City	and	those	of	Sao	Paulo,	Brazil	were	even	below	
those	of	Mexico	City.	The	problem	of	low	wages	is	the	central	source	of	
poverty	in	Mexico,	as	the	official	unemployment	rate	is	only	6.2	percent.	In	
Mexico,	the	vast	majority	of	people	are	poor	because	they	receive	low	
wages,	not	because	they’re	not	working.		
	
The	Attack	on	Unions		
There	have	been	great	ebbs	and	flows	in	union	membership	in	Mexico	over	
the	last	century	in	relation	to	the	level	of	class	struggle	and	the	policies	of	
the	government.	The	Revolution	produced	powerful	institutional	
mechanisms	that	gave	great	power	to	the	government	to	facilitate	or	
obstruct	union	formation.	These	powers,	based	on	article	123	of	the	
Constitution	of	1917	and	implemented	in	subsequent	labour	legislation	
allowed	the	government	to	declare	strikes	legitimate	or	illegitimate	as	well	
as	to	grant	or	deny	union	recognition.	Unions	had	to	walk	a	difficult	
tightrope	between	independence	and	currying	the	favour	of	the	ruling	
party	to	survive.	As	unions,	especially	their	leadership,	became	integrated	
into	the	ruling	party	when	it	was	formed	in	the	late	1930s,	it	provided	
them	a	means	of	influencing	government	labour	policy	and	a	powerful	
push	towards	becoming	part	of	the	state	system	of	labour	control.	As	the	
government’s	policies	turned	more	to	the	right	in	the	1940s	and	beyond,	
union	officialdom	became	a	more	and	more	privileged	state‐linked	
disciplining	oligarchy	over	its	own	members.	There	have	been	and	
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continue	to	be	bitter	struggles	between	rank	and	file	members	and	their	
official	leaders,	charros,	over	control	of	unions.	Further,	the	decadence	of	
this	stratum	of	charros	has	extended	to	the	sale	of	protection	contracts	and	
the	creation	of	phantom	unions,	“unions”	in	name	only,	selling	contracts	to	
management	to	prevent	the	formation	of	real	unions	and	often	not	even	
known	to	their	own	members.	Further,	many	of	the	unions	in	the	industrial	
region	around	Monterrey,	Nuevo	León,	are	white	or	company	unions	set	up	
by	the	region’s	extremely	right‐wing	capitalists	to	keep	out	real	or	charro	
unions.	There	are,	then,	two	sets	of	“unions”	that	are	not	unions,	the	
phantom	and	the	white	unions.	Charro	unions	have	a	greater	heterogeneity	
and	their	union‐like	character	will	vary	by	union	and	period,	depending	on	
rank	and	file	pressures,	political	considerations	of	the	charro	leaderships,	
and	relationship	to	management.	Some	engage	in	real	bargaining	for	their	
members,	others	are	completely	in	bed	with	management.	This	fictional	
and	semi‐fictional	character	of	most	Mexican	unions	makes	it	necessary	to	
approach	union	density	figures	in	Mexico	with	great	caution.	
Nevertheless,	it’s	clear	that	there	has	been	a	real	decline	in	union	
membership	in	the	last	decades,	The	Commission	for	Labour	Cooperation	
of	NAFTA	has	shown	that	the	rate	of	unionization	in	Mexico	declined	by	25	
percent	from	the	end	of	the	1980s	to	2003,	when	it	became	less	than	15	
percent	(North	American	Agreement	on	Labour	Cooperation	(NAALC)	
2003,	25).	The	crisis	of	the	public	sector	and	the	reclassification	of	more	
and	more	workers	as	employees	of	confidence	not	eligible	for	union	
membership	had	a	big	impact	on	union	membership.	The	recent	recession	
has	also	taken	a	toll	on	union	membership.	According	to	the	official	
statistics	of	the	Commission	for	Labour	Cooperation,	scarcely	4	million	
workers	out	of	an	economically	active	population	of	43	million	are	
members	of	unions.	If	you	were	to	peel	away	the	completely	fictional	
unions	(phantom	unions),	those	with	protection	contracts,	the	number	of	
union	members	would	be	greatly	reduced.	It’s	estimated	that	at	least	85	
percent	of	Mexican	workers	have	protection	contracts,	fake	contracts	
signed	by	corrupt	union	officials	to	exclude	genuine	unions	(Xelhuantzi	
López,	et	al.	2005,	151).	Of	the	remaining	15	percent,	most	are	members	of	
charro	unions,	corrupt,	authoritarian,	quasi‐corporatist,	government‐
linked	unions.	Thus	most	of	the	working	class	has	continued	to	lack	
organizations	through	which	to	build	effective	fight	backs	against	the	
relentless	neoliberal	assault	that	has	devastated	living	standards,	
workplace	health	and	safety,	and	workers’	rights	in	general.	
The	estimate	of	15	percent	is	based	on	non‐rural	workers	(private	
and	public),	excluding	those	in	small	familial	artisanal	shops.	The	rural	
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sector,	which	includes	only	15	percent	of	the	economically	active	
population,	only	has	a	unionization	rate	of	4	percent.	If	we	take	into	
account	the	whole	labour	force	of	the	country,	including	the	
proletarianized	or	semi‐proletarianized	rural	sectors	(including	mini‐
producers	and	ejidatarios,	who	often	also	work	as	seasonal	or	day	
labourers	within	Mexico	or	the	US),	the	rate	of	unionization	decreases	to	
11	percent,	which	would	give	Mexico	the	lowest	rate	of	unionization	of	the	
three	NAFTA	countries	(INEGI	2009).	
The	principal	consequence	of	the	corporate	offensive	has	been	the	
extreme	pauperization	of	workers	and	campesinos,	with	the	exception	of	
small	segments	that	preserved	some	elements	of	economic	well‐being	as	is	
the	case	with	the	oil	workers,	the	telephone	workers,	and	until	2009,	the	
power	workers	of	the	Light	and	Power	Company	of	the	Centre	(Luz	y	
Fuerza	del	Centro).	In	2009,	all	45,000	power	workers	were	fired	and	the	
company	liquidated.	But	for	the	immense	majority	of	workers	in	Mexico,	
the	profound	deterioration	of	the	purchasing	power	of	wages	is	a	
significant	and	defining	characteristic	under	the	new	capitalist	despotism.	
In	other	parts	of	Latin	America,	the	imposition	of	such	a	catastrophic	salary	
decline	was	only	possible	through	the	use	of	the	coercive	force	of	military	
coups	suffered	by	the	region	starting	with	the	military	coup	in	Brazil	in	
1964.	
	
Unemployment		
Neoliberal	policies	have	completely	failed	to	provide	new	formal	sector	
jobs	for	Mexico’s	rapidly	growing	labour	force.	Mexico	has	only	been	
creating	about	12	percent	of	the	new	jobs	needed	for	the	2	million	young	
people	entering	the	labour	market	each	year.	Only	2.2	million	new	jobs	
have	been	created	in	the	formal	sector	of	the	Mexico	economy	between	
2000	and	2010	while	20	million	people	have	joined	the	labour	market	
(IMSS	2010a).	These	figures	would	have	to	be	modified	by	taking	into	
account	the	opening	up	of	already	existing	jobs	through	retirement.	
Nevertheless,	the	job	deficit	is	enormous.	Neoliberal	policies,	by	opening	
the	economy	to	cheap	imports	and	removing	subsidies,	have	caused	a	
massive	loss	of	sources	of	livelihood	in	those	parts	of	the	rural	sector	that	
produce	for	the	domestic	market.	The	same	effects	have	been	felt	in	
industries	oriented	to	the	domestic	market.	But	these	losses	have	not	been	
offset	by	the	creation	of	new	jobs.	The	lack	of	significant	job	creation	
coupled	with	the	destruction	of	jobs	and	rural	livelihoods	has	fuelled	
massive	emigration	from	Mexico.	Mexico	is	a	gigantic	factory	for	producing	
pauperized	workers.	Every	day,	approximately	6,000	young	people	enter	a	
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labour	market	that	creates	only	slightly	more	than	700	spaces	daily.	The	
tremendous	number	of	undocumented	young	people	who	try	to	cross	the	
border	daily	are	only	a	small	portion	of	the	millions	of	dispossessed	youth	
whose	hopes	for	the	future	have	been	destroyed	by	the	neoliberal	project.	
On	the	other	hand,	the	informal	sector,	far	from	being	a	space	of	
self‐employed	workers,	marks	a	return	to	the	most	intense	forms	of	
exploitation	within	“small	establishments”:	in	1995,	the	number	of	wage	
earners	within	the	informal	sector	was	2.8	million	and	accounted	for	32	
percent	of	informal	employment.	By	2003,	wage	earners	in	the	informal	
sector	accounted	for	4.3	million	workers,	40	percent	of	those	working	in	
the	underground	economy,	those	companies	that	operate	without	any	
official	registration.	In	the	labour	market	as	a	whole,	formal	and	informal,	
27	million	workers	work	in	establishments	of	less	than	11	workers.	There	
are	600,000	“protection	contracts”	in	this	sector		of	small	workplaces.	Only	
three	percent	of	the	27	million	workers	in	small	establishments	are	
formally	unionized	(Xelhuantzi	López,	et	al.	2005,	40).	
The	present	crisis	has	had	a	devastating	impact	on	this	already	
vulnerable	labour	force,	of	which	approximately	two‐thirds,	or	32	million	
people,	remain	ensnared	in	the	informal	labour	market,	in	a	situation	of	
desperation	and	hopelessness,	and	only	one‐third,	17	million,	are	part	of	
the	formal	labour	market.	In	reality,	the	number	of	people,	that	exist	in	the	
interstices	of	the	economic	life	of	the	country,	without	even	gaining	a	
minimum	wage	(which,	at	present,	is	less	than	60	pesos	daily	or	less	than	
$5	US	daily),	has	reached	ten	million	people.	
There	has	been	renewed	job	growth	in	the	Mexican	economy	since	
the	crisis	of	2009	with	an	increase	of	714,000	jobs	in	the	formal	sector	
from	January	2009	to	January	2011.	However	64	percent	of	these	new	jobs	
are	at	the	lowest	end	of	the	pay	scale,	between	one	and	two	minimum	
salaries	(between	$5	and	$10	US	daily)	(IMSS	2010b).	The	transfer	of	jobs	
from	the	US	and	Canada	has	continued	through	the	crisis	but	at	rock‐
bottom	wage	levels.	Government	austerity	since	the	crisis	has	focused	on	
cutting	subsidies	to	gas	and	hydro	leading	to	price	increases	of	12	percent	
for	gas	and	15	percent	for	hydro	in	the	last	year.	These	price	increases	
have	contributed	to	the	high	general	inflation	of	wage	goods	in	Mexico.	
	
Towards a Fightback: Mexico and the Struggle for Workers’ Rights in North 
America  
The	Mexican	bourgeoisie	has	succeeded	in	defeating	and	dismantling	the	
economic	and	political	basis	of	power	of	the	old	party‐state	elites.	They	
have	also	succeeded	in	imposing	decades	of	austerity	on	the	Mexican	
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people.	But	they	have	not	been	able	to	consolidate	a	solid	historical	bloc,	a	
system	in	which	competition	and	conflict	could	be	contained	by	a	
hegemonic	consensus	among	the	key	political	and	economic	elites.	As	well,	
the	concurrent	neoliberal	assault	on	the	mass	of	the	population	has	
combined	with	the	on‐going	corruption	and	electoral	fraud	to	undermine	
attempts	at	legitimating	the	new	regime	to	the	mass	of	the	population.	
Mexico’s	organic	crisis,	simmering	in	the	last	decades	of	the	old	regime,	has	
come	close	to	boiling	over	several	times	in	the	post‐old	regime	period	
(since	2000)	as	in	the	anti‐electoral	fraud	protests	of	2006	and	in	the	
Oaxaca	uprising	that	same	year	(Roman	and	Velasco	2008).	
The	struggle	of	Mexican	workers	is	taking	place	in	this	context	of	an	
organic	crisis,	growing	militarization	and	repression,	the	continuation	of	
the	neoliberal	assault	on	popular	rights	and	wellbeing,	and	a	likely	
prolonged	economic	recession.	It	is	not	taking	place	in	a	context	of	a	
democratic	regime	or	an	actual	democratic	transition.	Though	Mexico’s	
“democratic	transition”	was	fuelled	by	the	democratic	aspirations	of	the	
middle	classes,	working	class,	and	popular	sectors,	it	has	been	largely	
captured	by	the	bourgeoisie	seeking	more	direct	control	of	the	Mexican	
state.	The	vast	majority	of	the	population	has	experienced	the	“democratic	
transition”	with	great	disappointment,	though	many	still	hope	to	push	it	
back	on	a	democratic	path.	But	they	face	political	and	economic	elites	who,	
in	spite	of	their	conflicts,	are	willing	to	use	ruthless	repression	against	any	
popular	challenges	to	their	power	and	privilege.	
The	working	class	movement	is	at	a	nadir	of	resistance.	The	on‐
going	state	repression	of	unions	(the	defeat	and	dismantling	of	the	SME,	
the	relentless	assault	on	the	miners’	union)	and	of	popular	movements	
(Atenco,	Oaxaca,	the	permanent	war	of	attrition	against	the	Zapatistas),	the	
continuing	state‐facilitated	thuggery	of	the	officials	of	major	unions	against	
their	own	members	(the	national	teachers	union	is	a	leading	example),	the	
job	losses	of	Mexican	workers	on	both	sides	of	the	border,	and	the	absence	
of	a	direction	of	struggle	that	seems	promising,	have	all	contributed	to	a	
demoralization	of	the	working	class	generally	and	of	working	class	
militants.	People	are	scrambling	to	survive	without	the	existence	of	
obvious	collective	ways	of	fighting	back.	
Nevertheless	there	are	significant	factors	that	point	to	the	
possibility	of	a	revival,	sooner	rather	than	later,	of	a	fight	back	on	the	part	
of	the	working	class.	Mexico’s	popular	revolutionary	tradition	lives	on	in	
both	working	class	and	in	peasant	and	indigenous	communities.	As	well,	
the	communalist	traditions	of	Mexico’s	peasants	and	indigenous	peoples	
have	migrated	along	with	these	peasants	and	indigenous	peoples	in	their	
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decades	of	proletarianization	and	urbanization.	These	traditions	survive	in	
urban	as	well	as	rural	areas	(which	now	contain	less	than	25	percent	of	the	
population).	
If	these	powerful	and	widely	spread	residues	of	revolutionary	
tradition	and	communalist	sensibility	have	a	wide	presence	in	the	popular	
classes,	the	relentless	character	of	Mexico’s	neoliberal	capitalist	offensive	
will	increasingly	compel	people	to	seek	collective	solutions.	The	hopes	for	
better	jobs,	more	rights,	and	a	more	civil	country	raised	by	the	decades	of	
struggle	for	a	democratic	transition,	by	the	false	promises	of	NAFTA	
making	Mexico	a	first‐world	country,	by	the	replacement	of	the	one‐party	
regime	in	the	presidential	elections	of	2000,	have	been	demolished	by	the	
realities	of	the	relentless	neoliberal	assault	and	the	new	austerity	being	
imposed	on	the	popular	classes	by	the	regime.	A	large	majority	of	Mexico’s	
population	lives	in	extreme	poverty;	many	are	being	pushed	over	the	edge	
of	survival	by	the	recent	crisis	which,	in	Mexico,	has	been	combined	with	
rising	food	and	utility	prices.	The	US	economic	crisis	has	both	closed	the	
safety	valve	of	the	US	labour	market	for	“surplus”	Mexican	workers	and	
dramatically	reduced	remittances	to	Mexico,	a	key	source	of	survival	for	
many	families	and	communities.	There	are	no	indications	of	an	economic	
revival	on	the	horizon	as	Mexico’s	dependence	on	the	US	economy	
guarantees	that	Mexico’s	recovery	will	be	as	slow	as	that	of	the	US.	The	
government	of	Mexico	is	carrying	out	austerity	programs	that	will	both	
make	life	harsher	for	workers	and	the	poor	and	make	a	recovery	more	
difficult.	
The	new	Mexican	workers’	movement	cannot	develop	on	the	basis	
of	trade	unionism	alone.	Workers	will	continue	to	face	severe	and	brutal	
repression	by	the	state,	private	capital,	and	charros.	The	new	movement	
will	have	to	challenge	the	very	framework	and	institutions	of	repression.	
Union	and	workers’	rights	can	only	achieve	any	durability	in	a	transformed	
institutional	framework.	The	fight	for	reformist	goals	and	democratic	
demands	(right	of	association,	civil	liberties,	etc.)	have	to	be	blended	with	
strategies	in	which	workers	prepare	themselves	ideologically	and	
organizationally	for	a	transformational	struggle.	
The	struggle	of	Mexican	workers	has	powerful	continental	
dimensions.	Mexico	is	part	of	NAFTA	along	with	its	two	northern	
neighbours.	US	and	Canadian	companies,	especially	auto	and	auto	parts,	
have	major	investments	in	Mexico.	And	the	Mexican	working	class	has	a	
powerful	presence	in	the	US	labour	force.	Around	one‐fifth	of	the	Mexican	
working	class	works	in	the	US	and	Mexicans	make	up	the	largest	segment	
of	the	immigrant	section	of	the	US	working	class.	This	means	that	events	in	
ROMAN	and	ARREGUI:	The	Fragile	Rise	of	Bourgeois	Hegemony	
 
257 
the	Mexican	class	struggle	will	resound	powerfully	in	the	US	(with	echoes	
in	Canada).	
Worker’s	insurgency	in	Mexico	will	immediately	trigger	hostile	
responses	from	US	and	Canadian	capital	as	well	as	their	governments.	
Mexican	workers	will	need	solidarity	from	the	North	to	oppose	open	or	
disguised	military	intervention,	an	intervention	whose	foundations	have	
been	set	already	with	Plan	Mexico	(security	and	military	cooperation	
agreement	between	the	US	and	Mexico).	But	beyond	this	essential	anti‐
interventionist	solidarity,	there	needs	to	develop	a	strategy	of	common	
struggles	over	related	though	not	identical	demands	around	social	justice,	
workers’	rights,	and	genuine	democracy.	
Continental	integration	of	North	America,	especially	through	
NAFTA,	has	afforded	US	and	Canadian,	as	well	as	Mexican,	capital	powerful	
levers	for	downward	pressures	on	the	whole	North	American	working	
class,	including	the	Mexican.	But	it	has	also	added	an	explosive	ingredient	
to	the	North	American	panorama	of	class	struggle:	a	young,	super‐
exploited	working	class	with	old	revolutionary	and	communalist	traditions	
in	a	ruthless	regime	in	deep	and	multiple	crises.	When	Mexico’s	working	
class	jaguar	rises,	the	roar	will	resonate	deep	into	the	North.	
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